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ence onFaxResearch.NOTES ON THE TAX TREATbENT
OF IWMAI'1 CAPITAL*
MichaelJ. Boskin
Over the last decade and a half, economists have rediscovered the
ciceptof human capital.1 The analysis of both the discrepancy between
thegrowth ofoutput and inputs in industrialized economies and the
distribution of earnings has led economists to focus on the acquisition
ofknowJedgeand skills by human beings. It is now widely recognized
that such human capital investments as expenditures on education, job—
training,migration andhealth are an important feature of advanced
economies.
Whilehumancapital hasplayed a central role in labor economics
for some time, andingrowth accounting from time to time it only
rarely has crept into the mainstrean of public finance. Most analyses
of tax incidence and of the efficiency properties of alternative tax
devices have simply ignored humancapital.Further, most analyses of
human capital have simply ignored taxes. When labor economists have
attempted to discuss the taxtreatmentOf humancapital,or when public
financiers have attempted to incorporate human capital into the analysis
ofaproblem in taxation, the result frequently has been an unsupported
assumption that the current taxtreatmentof human capital discourages
*Thispaper is part of a larger project on the taxation of human capital.
Sections 2 and 3 are each being expanded into more thorough treatments
of incidence and efficiency, respectively.
This rediscovery is frequently associated with T. W.Schultz'presiden—
tiniaddress(l961, arid Becker [1961W Kiker [19661trabesthe human
capital'onreptbackto Petty.
2eeU r 1.1 chen [19701,Becker{i967),andMincer 119691.—2—
itsaccumulation. For example, in his widely—heralded presidential
address, T. W. Schultz asserts:3
Our tax laws everywhere discriminate against human
capital. Although the stock of such capital has become
large and even though it is obvious that human capital,
like other forms of reproducible capital, depreciates,
becomes obsolete and entails maintenance, our tax laws
are all but blind on these matters.
Further, virtually every writer on the modern theory of optimal income
taxation1 defends the assumption ofan elasticity of substitution between
the consumption of goods and leisure much larger than empirical studies
of labor supply would suggest by invoking tax disincentives to human
capital accumulation.
While the issue is basically an empirical one, some light can be
shed on the efficacy of such statements by carefully examining the ways
in which taxes affect human capital accumulation. Section 1 presents a
preliminary attempt at such a clarification.
If the current tax system, (or any proposed alternative) does
discourage human capital accumulation, the overall economic implications
are potentially enormous. Kendrick [19T estimates that the aggregate
annual investment in human capital is of the seine order of magnitude as
conventionally measured savings. Any significabt tax—induced decrease
in human capital accumulation might result in a large decrease in out-
put a. nd/or redistribution of income. Section 2 outlines a simple general
equilibrium modelwith two capital goods —physicaland human —andthe
savingcorresponding toeach,to begin to deal with these issues.
$chu]tz[1.961,],p. 17. However, Becker [.1964] and Goode[1962) point
cuethe tax—fr cc. nature oP foregone earnings.
See Mirrlees [1971 arid Sheshinski [1972] as examples.—3—
Oncehuman capital is flewed as an alternative source of wealth
andhencehumancapitalinvestment as a source of current saving (re-
sources withdrawnfromcurrent consumption to help increase future
output5),the old issue of the differentialtaxtreatmentof alternative
typesof capital arises.
6Sensible tax policy with respect to the tax-
ation of' either physical or human capital must take into account the
tax treatment of the alternative asset. Section 3 outlines some points
of departure for such an analysis.
Recognized quite some time ago by Abramovitz (1956].
6
Discussed in detail in the static case by Harberger [1966].1. Does the Current Tax Treatment Discourage
Human Capita). Investment?
As noted above, when the effects of the current tax treatment of
human capital is discussed, the presumption appears to be that a large
disincentive to such investment exists. Certainly this has never been
documented empirically. Nor do adherents to this view identify the real
culprit in the situation. Is it the taxation of the returnsto human
investment at a positive rate? Is it the progressive rate structure
of the personal income tax? Is it the failure to alloweducational ex-
pense deductions? Is it the income effect ofthe tax combined with
differential public and private marginal propensities to invest in
human capitalt
While the effects of the personal income tax on human capital
investment depends upon all of these details, we begin by focusing on
what we believe to be the single most important feature of therelation
between human capital investment and the tax system, namelythat the
bulkofsuch investments arefinancedout of foregone earnings which
arenot taxed. The failure to appreciate this basic featureof human
investment is, we believe, a source of much of the confusion onthe
effectsof taxes on humaninvestment.
FromKeridrick {19751, we note that roughly eighty percentof
humancapitalinvestment consists of education and informal on—the—job
training; the remaining twenty percent consists of approximatelyequal
Again, Becker [1964] and Goode [1962] potht this out, but they do not
develop the implications (of the failure to tax foregone earnings) for
efficiency or equity stressed below.—5—
amountsof mobility and health expenditures. Further, Mincer [1962]
estimates that roughly forty percent of combined education and training
costsare accounted for by on—the—job training. Virtually all of
job training costs.are foregone earnings as are perhaps three—fourths
of higher education costs and some fraction of medical and migration
costs. Thus, well over one half of human capital investment costs
consist of foregone earnings.
Letus take on—the—job training as an example. In the early
part of the typical work life, it appears that a substantial fraction
of time spent on the job is devoted to training as opposed to directly
productivework. While the distinction between work and investment
is very difficult to make in practice, an interesting analysis by Heck—
man [1973] indirectly infers that the percentage of time spent training
may be ashigh as thirty or forty percent in the earlyyears of labor
marketexperienceand declines toward zero over perhaps twenty years or
so. Hence, a typical young worker earning $10,000 per year may be
directly working only two—thirds of the time, being paid at an annual
rate of $15,000 and buying back one—thirdof his time for training
(acquisitionof skills) for $5,000.
How is this $5,000 human capital investment taxed? The worker's
true income is $15,000; at a flat tax rate of t, with no depreciation
of the human capital investment, the worker pays a tax of $l5,000t.
Sincethe $5,000 in humaninvestmentis financed out of foregoz earnings
80fàourse, this percentage also may be influenced by tax considerations.—6—
whichare tax—free, the worker's actual taxpaymentis $1O,000t.The
failure to taxforegoneearnings is thus equivalent to an inmediate
write—off of the investmentcost.9
In the absence of an income tax,theworker would engage in on—
the—job training up to the point where the incrementalinvestment cost
just matched the present value of expected future returns.En ourex-
ample,the $5,000 cost must be matched by at least a present value of
$5,000 in expected future returns from the investment. The imposition
ofa tax ata flat rate tonthe income from the investment reduces the
netreturn by one—third; the instantaneous write—off reduces the tax liability
by one—third (at the margin). The present valueof the depreciation deduction
equals the cost of the investment and if the training was a profitable
investment with no tax, it is still profitable in the presence ofthe
tax—free foregone earnings.
More formally, the prospective investor in job training purchases
anasset —skill,knowledge, etc. —costingC and yielding an incre-
mentalincome stream .Thepresent discounted value of the job





SeeE. C. Brown [l95] for adiscussion of the neutrality of immediate
depreciation (plus loss offsets) of physical capital.Also see White
and White [1971ij for a comparison of expensing and economic depreciation.—7—
where r is the rate of interest. When the asset is purchased with
foregone earnings, the net return to investing in the training (or





If the investment was worth undertaking in the no tax situation, it is
still worth undertaking and a flat rate income tax which does not
include foregone earnings in the tax base does not discourage human
capital investments financed out of foregone earnings.
•
The major human capital investment cost which is not tax exempt
is the direct cost of education, i.e. tuition, books and relatedexpenses.
It is these expenses which have received the most attention in the public
financeliterature. The argument has been that such expenditures are a
valid cost of earning income and should be deductible either when made
10
or depreciated throughout the working life.While true economic depre-
ciation of educational expenses would be nondistortionary (since under
true economic depreciation the differential equation describing the
valueof human capital is independent of the tax rate, the value of the
11
investment would not be affected by the tax) it is not the only way to
achieve neutrality. Indeed, any tax which between its interest deducti—
10
See Goode [1962 ]fora discussion of these issues. Frequently ignored
is the lack of taxation on the human capital gain during education;
this tax is postponed until the income stream is realized.
11
See Stiglitz [1975). Indeed, this discussion closely follows his dis—
cussion of tax depreciation of physical capital.—8—
bilityand depreciation allowances yields a deduction whose present
value equals the investment cost is neutral. While I would be the
last to argue that capital markets work perfectly, particularly in
financing human investment, a modest fraction of higher educa-
tion expenses are financed by borrowing and at least the interest
on this debt is deductible against future income.
In analyzing when tax depreciation of educational expenses
would be neutral it is important to note that many students invest-
ing in education have little other income and hence would not benefit
12
from immediate write—off of out—of—pocket educational expenses. Un-
less they were allowed to carry such a write—off forward for a consid-
erable period, the present value of the depreciation allowance will
fall short of the present value of the tax liability on the return to
the investment and hence will discourage investment in education.
The progressive rate structure of the personal income tax acts
in an analogous manner and not just on educational investments. Any
human capital investment which increases future earnings enough to
drive the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket (after accounting for in-
comeaveragingprovisions) may decrease the ratio of the present value
of the depreciation allowance to the present value of the incremental
tax liability. Investments which are profitable at the current tax rate
Given theexemptionsand deducrions in the income tax.—9—
maynot be so when account is taken of the increased future tax rate.
In the on—the—job training example noted.abOve, the worker will require
a before tax expected present value of increased earnings of $3333/(l—t')
where t' is the new (presumably higher than one—third) marginal tax rate.
If the new rate is forty percent, he requires an increase of $5555in
present value terms, or about eleven percent more titan with the un—
'hanged tax rate.
In addition to the distortion in the amount at the investment in
humancapital,the taxsystemalso alters the composition of humanin-
vestment.For example, the instantaneous depreciation of foregone earnings
(relative to slower economic depreciation) favors longer,.lived human in-
vestments, e.g. general, rather than job specific, on—the—job training.
The final source of tax distortions in human investment decisions
stems from the income effect of the tax. Since the tax revenue transfers
resources from the private to the public sector, the issue hinges on
differential marginal propensities to invest in human capital publicly
and privately. There is a substantial amount of public human capital
investment, hut separating the marginal from the average propensityto
invest in human capital is not easy; nor is it easy to determine to
what extent the private sectár adjusts its own human capital investment
decisions to the perceived public investment.
Insummary,the current progressive rate structure of the personal
income tax probably creates a disincentive to accumulate human capital;
this disincentive is perhaps most severe for secondary workers in two—
earner families whose incremental incomes from human investment may gen——'a-
eratea largeincrease in marginal tax rates. The lack of an educational
expenditure depredation allowance probably biases investments away from
education to job training. While the extent of these distortions is
primarily an empirical matter——which forms the bulk of the research yet
to be conducted——recall that a substantial fraction of human investment
is exempt from tax.
Finally, we note that the optimal investment decisions of house-
holds deal simultaneously with human investment and conventional
saving.A full examination of the effects of the taxsystemon human
investmentrequires an analysis of the taxtreatmentof physical
capital and the potential substitution of physical andhuman capital.
Indeed,intelligent tax policy with respect to the depreciation of
physical capital should account for the special, and perhaps inevitable,
tax treatment of human capital. We begin to deal with these issues below.
We merely note here that the result described above, neutrality of a
flatratetax, does not hold when nonhuman capital is introduced into
theanalysis.While theresult depends upon the details of depreciation
allowances,method of finance and interest deductibility for nonhuman
capital, a tax increasemay well induce substitution of human for non-
human capital.— 11—
2.Tax Incidence in an Economy with Human Capital 'Accumulation.
until quite recently, the typical analysis of the effects
of taxes on the distribution of income has been made in a static
context. Fixed stocks of capital and labor may be mobile across
sectors in response to after—tax return differentials in such
models, but the problem of the growth of factor supplies has
been relatively ignored. A series of recent papers has refocus-
ed attention on tax—induced changes in saving, capital accumula—
13 tionand the long—run distribution of income. Most of these
studies have adopted rather simplistic savings functions. In
perhaps the most important of these papers, Feldetein 974a_/
has generalized the savings behavior to allow both differential
propensities to save out of wages, profits and government revenue
and a potentially interest—elastic savings rate. In /1974W,
he demonstrates that a significant fraction of a capital inôome
tax may be shifted to labor via a decreased capital—labor
(and hence wage/rental) ratio.Perhaps the most surprising
although in retrospect quite understandable —resultfrom his
work isthat in the long—run the elasticity of the supply of.
labor is totally irrelevant in determining the incidence 62 the
See Diamond /197Q,SatoL1962/, xryzyaniak Ll962/, and
Feldstein /197417and/1974b7.— 12—
tax.This occurs because of the usual assumption of a constant
returns to scale technology under which only the rate of growth
of the labor force, not its size at any point in time, affects
the wage/rental ratio.
While these models of long—run tax incidence have not yet
been totally assimilated in the teaching and practice of public
finance, I believe it is important to extend such models to
account for the second -andquantitatively equally as important —
typeof capital accumulation in advanced economies: investment
embodied in the knowledge and skills of the labor force. In
models designed to examine the long—run incidence of a tax, we
would do well to adopt a more general view of the supply of labor,
definingit not just as total person—hours of work but in its
envelope sense, subsuming human capital investments.
From this perspective, the rate of growth of the effective,
or quality—corrected labor force, may be affected by taxes.
Indeed,a tax which lowers the after—tax rental rate on human
capital, such as an income or payroll tax, given the rate of
interest and the price of any purchased inputs in human capital
14
production,will decrease human capital investment unless an
'5
appropriate depreciation policy is followed. This in turn
Il
SeeBen—Porath 219707
See section 1 above.— 13—
willdrive up the ratio of physical to human capital and the
ratio of unit rental rates of men to machines. In symmetry with
the result of Feldstein quoted above, taxes on human capital,
i.e. taxes on earnings, may be shifted in part to owners of
physical capital. While I am still in the process of experi-
menting with alternative forms of representing this phenomenon
in a simple general equilibrium setting, let us sketch out some
of the basic consideration. This is done most readily by taking
the Feldstein model as our point of departure and making some
simple additions.
Following Griliches /197.Q,wedefine a constant return
to scale production function of physical capital, K, and quality—
corrected labor, EN, where N is the nuither of workers and E is
a labor—augmenting quality multiplier:
YF(K,EN) (1)





EhY— E • (3)
N
where Sand are depreciation rates and s and h represent— 14—
16
saving rates, for physical and human capital.
The population grows exogerieously at rate n
(4)
N





Factors are paid their respective marginal products:
=r(1 + (4)
FL =w(l-FYL) (5)
where r and w are after—tax factor returns and Pt.isthe rate
1
oftax on factorI
Following Feldsteifl L1974aandl974/, we allow saving
to respond to its rate of return; however, each type of saving
17
will depend upon the returns to ech type of saving:
s =s(r, w) (6)
16
Conlisk /1970J uses this model to discuss the residual in
growth accounting.
17
An integenerational family model suffices to justify such aformulation
even if we are skeptical of the cross—elasticitiesIn the case of a
single individual. Uncertainly is ignored in the presentdiscussion,
but hedging away from the relatively more uncertain factor incomeIs
potentially important.— 15—
h=h(r, w) (7)
where r and w are returns to physical and human capital, respec—
18
t ively.
Again, following Feldstein, we also allow short—runlabor
supply to respond to its return:
L 1(w). N (8)
Finally, the equilibrium growthpathrequires L ,so
L K
sLY =hKY+nKL. (9)
This systemof equations can be transformed (via sub-
stitution and total differentiation) into a system of linear
equations in which dw and dr, the change in the returnsto
human and physical capital, are a function of the taxratesand
saving and human capital accumulation propensities,their rate—
of—return sensitivities and the parameters of the production
technology, i.e.
dw =f(s, h, 5r' 5w' Fir, 1'w'
'P1.P1)
dr =.g(s, h, 5r' 5w' hr, hw r,a, 11
Weal],ow our notation t slip here, confusing ratesof return
and rental prices. An additional unit of human capital earn-
ing w at each point of time from t to T has a marginalrate of
return of w (1 —e(Tt)), where r is the interest rate.—16
wheresubscripts denote partial derivatives,risthe elasti-
city of substitution in productionand cClabor's share in
production.
The incidence of the tax nay be inferred fromthe change
inthereturns to physical andhumancapital. The important
pointto note is that the "long—run" supply oflabor and the sen-
sitivity of human capital to itsreturn,doaffect the in-
cidence ofthe tax.
It is also important to note that even ifhuman capital
accumulation is own rate—of—return inelastic, or if tax policy
appropriately neutralizes the direct effectot the tax on
the rate of return to human investment, a more generalsavings
behavior allowing differential public and private propensities
to invest in human capital would suff ice torender human capital
accumulation important in the analysis of long—run taxinci-
dence.
Letme conclude thiS sectionby notingthe woefully in-
adequate empirical information uponwhich to approximate long-run
tax incidence. While we have a fairly decenthandleon the.
parametersof the production function, we have verylittle in-
formation usable in obtaining a rough guide tothe conventional
saving and human capital accumulation equations.We have— 17—
virtuallyno information on the latter (indeed, anestimate of
the annual investment can be obtained only indirectly); onthe
former, a renewed interest has emerged, butinclusion of the
interestrate in consuit ion functions or savings equationsis
the exception, rather than the rule, worse yet, useof the
nominalrather than the real interest rate quite likely biases
19
the result toward a zero interest elasticity.
Thus, an improved set of estimates of savingsfunctions
and a (any? )setof estimates of human capital accumulation
equations, as well as a better grasp on government savingand
human investment, are essential to shed some light on long—run
tax incidence.
See Feldsteiri /197g.— 18—
3.Some Brief Comments on Optimal Capital Accumulation
In Section 1 above, we focused on some of the ways the tax
syAtem affected directly the accumulation of humancapital;
in Section 2, we introduced physical capital as well and out-
lined a model of long—run tax incidence. We return now to the
question of efficient capital accumulation when we account simul-
taneously for physical 'and human capital accumulation.
Consider the problem of maximizing social welfare measured
as the discounted. sum of individual utilities:
00
r•,.—t VsJc Pt U (Ct)at (10)
0.
subject to the constraints
=SF(K,L)
L =hF(K,Li +nL
where C =(1s—h)F (K )
N
and 5t. lit> 0
St +ht 1.
Given initial stocks of physical and human capital, we may apply
the maximum principle to this problem by defining the present
value of the Hamiltonian as:—19—
(Kb, Lt, St, lit, q. Vt.t )=
e—I,tlPtU(ct)
+qtBF(Kt, 4)+ (11)
Vt (litF (Kt. 4) + nt
wheree_Pttand C"Vtare the auxiliary variablesassociated
with the differential equations defining capitalaccumulation.
Necessary and sufficient conditionsfor a maximum are the follow—
.ing:
K =sF (Kt, Lt) (with ic)O)
H = F(Kt. 4)+nL
= — StF_/








Where subscripts denote partialdifferentiation. Substituting




20Ispare the reader the laboriousproof of this proposition.— 20—
WhereC =—c the elasticity of marginal utility.
This thus: obvious that optimality requires
Fk =FL
i.e. the marginal efficiency of physicaland human capital must
be equal. This result hardly should be surprising;it is precisely
analo7ous to the usual efficiencyrule of equalizing gross—of—tat
rates of return on physical capital in all uses.Again in analogy
withthe usual treatment of the physical capital stock, ownersof
capital will respond to net—of—tax ratesof return in making their
investmentchoices. It is thus inappropriate solely toexamine
the tax treatment of physical capital, or ofhuman capital, in
isolation. The tax treatment of each must beexamined simultan-
eously.
While a detailed analysis of this propositionis beyond
the scope of these notes a few general remarkswill serve to
illustrate some of its implications. First,it is obvious
that our tax system through exclusion, preferences.maximum rates
and other devices often imposes different ratesof tax on income
from physical and human capital accruing tothe same.taxpayiflg
unit in the same year. The same taxpayingunit also faces widely
different rates on the two types of income giventhe usual life—
cycle patterns of the two types of savingand the progressive— 21—
ratestructure and limited averaging possibilities in the
current personal income tax, while there may well be other
social objectives served by such differentation, it does distort
the composition and timing of investment choices.
Second, there may well be inherent constraints in the tax
treatment of human capital which have important implications for
the tax treatment of physical capital. For example, liquidity
and enforceability constraints may make it extremely costly
to attempt to include foregone earnings in the tax base, i.e.
itis likely that a large fraction of human capital investments
must betax—exemptand thus treated as ifinstantaneouslydepre-
ciated. Even if we achieve the Objective of uniform tax treat—
merit of income from physical capital inallsectors of the economy
(viawhatever combination of rate structure, depreciation allow-
ance and other devices is necessary), if the tax system uniformly
loweredthe rate of return of all types of physical capital
relative to human capital, we would be underinvesting in physical
capital. Indeed if it is the case that the tax system discrimi-
nates against physical capital relative to human capital (I
suspect it does but this is a difficult proposition to establish
given the wide variation in effective tax rates on alternative
types of physical and human capital), a strong case could be made
2).
See BOskin (1975) for a discussion of the inabilityto tax
foregone earings due to household work.-22--
22
for liberalization of the tax treatment of physical capital. In a
sequel, I will report on a set of optimal tax rules for the taxation of
physical capital under alternative constraints on the tax treatment of
human capital. We also note that this distortion in taxation of human
and physical capital is exacerbated by inflation, since human and physical
capital have different proportions of tax recovery of costs via depreciation.
In any event, we plan to attempt to say something empirical on this point
in future research.
Finally, let me conclude with a proviso:
Our entire analysis hasbeen conducted in the usual elosed economy
framework. In an open economy, tax policies may be disciplined sharply by
the (actual or potential) international movement of human, as well as
financial, capital.
.22
Efficient allocation of the total capital stock may thus directly conflict
with short—run income distribution objectives.— 23—
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